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 A B S T R A C T  
This research investigated whether real earnings management and 
corporate governance affect the firm’s credit rating in Indonesia. 
Specifically, investigation on whether real earning management 
components, represented by AbnCFO, AbnDisExp and AbnPROD, 
together with corporate governance components, which are 
represented by board size, independent board and audit committee 
affect the firm’s credit rating. This research used several corporate 
governance mechanisms developed by Bursa Efek Indonesia and credit 
rating classification developed by PEFINDO. Multiple regression 
model is selected to test this research problem. This research found 
that AbnCFO and board size affected the firm’s credit rating, while 
AbnPROD, independent board and audit committee did not affect 
credit rating. 
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In financial and economic markets, 
rating agencies play an essential role, as was 
done during the 2008 crisis. Rating agencies 
use the information provided by the 
company's management that is ranked and the 
company's financial statements that are rated 
to produce a rating (rating) ) regarding the 
company's overall creditworthiness and to 
issue particular debt. This ranking accurately 
represents the rating agency's opinion about a 
company's solvency, conditioning its ability to 
interpret the information presented in its 
financial statements correctly.  
 The theoretical relationship between 
the quality of accounting information with 
credit ratings can be determined by 
understanding or the purpose of credit ratings. 
Reputable rating agencies such as Standard 
and Poor's (rater/rating) define the domestic 
long-term issuer credit rating as an opinion of 
the overall rate (the company ranked) to meet 
its financial obligations. The ability of the 
ranked party to generate current and future 
cash flows is probably the most critical factor 
in assessing the strength of the ranking party 
to pay the loan principal and current and 
future debt interest. One of the primary 
sources of information from cash flow 
information is the company's financial 
statements. Standards and Poor's (S&P) states 
that they base on the company's financial 
statements ranked in determining rankings. 
The accounting literature identifies real 
earnings management as one of the methods 
employed by managers to be able to 
manipulate financial statement information. 
Zang (2012) states that practical earnings 
management has been seen as an act of 
substitution for accrual-based earnings 
management. Real earnings management is 
measured by abnormal cash flows from 
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operations, unexpected production costs, 
unusual discretionary expenditures 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen & Zarowin, 
2010; Zang, 2012; Zhao, Chen, Zhang, & Davis, 
2012; Siriviriyakul, 2013). 
 The quality of accounting information 
can also be influenced by good corporate 
governance. Corporate governance at the 
company level offers a general view of the 
environment where financial statements are 
prepared and where accounting choices are 
made. Companies with poor governance will 
be more willing to engage in unethical 
behavior or lack reasonable internal control to 
reduce earnings management in the form of 
accruals or real activities. As a result, rating 
agencies can see companies with poor 
governance as riskier and have less 
creditworthiness. Rating agencies can also 
consider the governance environment when 
assessing earnings management behavior 
(Geiszler, 2014) 
 The rating of a company is determined 
by the score of a rating agency that looks at the 
probability distribution of future cash flows. 
Credit is determined by assessing the 
likelihood that future cash flows will be 
sufficient to cover the cost of principal 
payments and repayment capacity. Then it can 
be seen that the average cash flow distribution 
of the company shifts downwards. The rating 
also experiences changes in each company, 
with the change in rank can be one of the 
factors that influence the direction of 
investment. The score is not a recommendation 
to sell, buy, or hold, nor is it a comment like 
the stock analysis. Ratings are formed based 
on information provided by rating agencies or 
information obtained from other reliable 
sources. The ratings may change, be 
withdrawn, or be delayed due to changes in 
the company's debt repayment capacity. 
 A credit rating agency or a credit rating 
agency (Credit Rating Agency), is a company 
that issues credit ratings for bond issuers. 
Rating agencies function as information 
intermediaries and play a role in improving 
capital market efficiency by increasing the 
transparency of securities and reducing 
information asymmetry between investors and 
bond issuers. Therefore rating agencies 
provide more efficient services (Beaver et al., 
2006). The issuer of bonds that can be traded 
on the secondary market is usually a company, 
city, institution, non-profit, or government of a 
country: credit Rating measures 
creditworthiness and the ability to repay debts 
and affect the interest rates charged. 
 Several incidents raise the question of 
whether the ratings assessed by rating 
agencies in Indonesia are accurate. According 
to (Chan et al., 1995), one of the reasons why 
the grade issued by the rating agency is biased 
because the rating agency does not monitor the 
company's performance every day, and the 
rating agency only assesses the occurrence of 
an event. Besides, there is no further 
explanation from the rating agency how 
financial statements and non-financial factors 
can be used in determining ratings. According 
to Matthies (2013), determinants of credit 
ratings are three main categories. The first is 
financial ratios and financial data. These 
variables are proxy for company-specific 
factors such as leverage, liquidity, and 
company size (for example, Ederington (1985); 
Blume et al., (1998); Kamstra (2003); The 
second category is the corporate governance 
mechanism. Here, factors such as ownership 
structure and board of commissioners are 
measured (Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003); 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009).  
 The company's ability to repay loans is 
a determining factor used by creditors to 
provide loans. Bankruptcy experienced by 
large companies triggers companies to pay 
more attention to their financial condition 
before issuing investment decisions. Credit 
Rating is one indicator that shows how well a 
company is managing economic problems 
experienced by the company. Company Credit 
Rating can provide information about the 
company's state, especially regarding loan 
payments made by the company. The 
company's credit rating reflects the ratings 
held by the rating agency regarding its 
creditworthiness and the issuance of bonds. 
The rating agency uses information provided 
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by the company's management that is ranked 
and the company's financial statements that 
are rated to produce a rating of the company's 
overall creditworthiness and to issue certain 
debts. This ranking accurately represents the 
rating agency's opinion about a company's 
solvency, conditioning their ability to interpret 
well the information presented in the 
company's financial statements.  
 Previous research has examined the 
relationship between corporate governance 
and the amount and quality of information 
disclosure made by companies (Eng & Mak, 
(2003); Ajinkya et al. (2005); Davidson et al. 
(2005); Karamanou and Vafeas (2005); Baxter 
and Cotter (2009); Wang and Hussainey (2013). 
The study results found that good corporate 
governance will lead to higher quality 
disclosures in mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures and lead to higher profit 
forecasting. Related to the lack of earnings 
management actions and lower fraud incidents 
(Beasley (1996); Peasnell et al. (2000); Klein 
(2002); Dechow et al. (2012), the effect of 
corporate governance on financial statement 
users. Such as business analysts (Byard et al., 
2006) and agency credit ratings have also been 
tested (Ball et al. (2012); Bradley & Chen 
(2015); Kent and Stewart (2008)). This edition 
wants to test Does Real Profit Management, 
and Corporate Governance Affect Credit 
Rating in Indonesia?  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Credit Rating 
 Rating is a standardized assessment of 
the ability of a country or company is paying 
its debts. The rank of a company can be 
compared with other companies to distinguish 
who has better and less expertise. Rating 
companies issue ratings, and usually, to 
become a rating company must obtain official 
permission from the government. According to 
Karyani and Manurung (2006), evaluation is 
one of the variables that is considered by 
investors when deciding to invest in a 
company. The information contained in the 
rating will indicate the extent of a company's 
ability to pay its obligations on funds invested 
by investors. Investors usually prefer 
companies that have high grades compared to 
companies that have deficient ratings. 
Therefore, for a company's bonds with a small 
enough rank to be sold in the market, investors 
will usually charge a higher premium as 
compensation for the risks borne by investors. 
The rating process's primary purpose is to 
provide accurate information about the 
financial performance and business position of 
the company's industry that issues bonds 
(bonds) in the form of ratings to potential 
investors (Rahardjo, 2004). 
 The Credit Rating Agency is a 
company that issues credit ratings for bond 
issuers. The Credit Rating measures 
creditworthiness, the ability to repay debt, and 
affects the interest rates charged on the 
mortgage. Companies can also use credit 
ratings as a tool to enhance the company's 
brand image or market image. Companies 
with good ratings enter the market with higher 
confidence. Also, the valid score can increase 
economic growth because it promotes public 
investment in the corporate sector. Therefore, 
any research model that can predict a 
company's credit rating will have a significant 
impact both for the general public (who are 
looking for investment opportunities) and the 
company itself (which strives to achieve 
company goals). 
 The general benefits of the credit rating 
process are (Rahardjo, 2004): 
1. A transparent market openness information 
system that involves a variety of healthy and 
open bond products. 
2. Cost efficiency. Good rating results usually 
provide benefits, namely avoiding financial 
requirement obligations that typically burden 
companies such as providing sinking funds, or 
guarantee assets. 
a. Determine the amount of the coupon, the 
better the rating tends to the lower the coupon 
value and vice versa. 
 By analyzing its financial or 
management and business fundamentals, 
every investor will assess the business 
feasibility of the issuer's business. Also, 
investors will be able to evaluate the level of 
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risk arising from the investment.  
 In conducting the rating process, 
several things that must be considered in 
performing a rating analysis are (Rahardjo, 
2004) 
a. Industrial Performance. 
Discussed aspects of industrial competition, 
prospects, and market share, the availability of 
raw materials, strong industrial structure, the 
influence of government policies, and other 
economic policies. 
b. Financial performance. 
Asset quality aspects are profitability ratios, 
asset management, and capital adequacy ratio 
liabilities, debt management levels, adequacy 
ratios of interest payments. 
c. Non-Financial Performance. 
The non-financial performance consists of 
Management aspects, company reputation, 
and identity agreements (including sinking 
funds, debt tests, dividend tests, mergers, and 
sale of assets). 
 In Indonesia, companies that get 
permits and become market leaders in 
granting ratings are PT. PEFINDO (Indonesian 
Securities Rating Agency). PT PEFINDO is 
working with an overseas rating company, 
Standard and Poor. This company must have a 
technical assistant from a rating company 
abroad. Lately, there are new companies that 
have similar business fields, namely Fitch 
Rating Indonesia and ICRA (Indonesia Credit 
Rating Indonesia). 
 
 Credit Rating is the opinion of rating 
agencies and an informative source for 
investors regarding the risk of traded 
securities (Based on the Decree of BAPEPAM 
and Kep-151 / BL / 2009). The ranking 
information is expected to help investors in 
making investment decisions. The primary 
function of a rating agency is to provide an 
objective, independent and credible rating on 
credit risk from debt securities (debt) 
published in general through rating activities. 
Rating agencies also produce and publish 
credit information relating to the loan capital 
market. This publication covers credit opinions 
on bond issuers and related sectors. The rating 
assessment process is carried out by 
considering everything about financial and 
non-financial information, including company 
operations, company management, company 
financial statements, and corporate planning. 
 Several rating bonds issued by rating 
agencies, among others (Manurung, et al, 2008) 
1. Standards & Poor's are: AAA, AA +, AA, 
AA-, A +, A, A-, BBB +, BBB, BBB-, BB +, BB, 
BB-, B +, B, B-, CCC +, CCC, CCC- , D 
2. Moody's: Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, A1, A2, A3, 
Baa1, Baa2, Baa3, Baa1, Ba2, Ba3, B1, B2, B3, 
Caa1, Caa2, Caa3, Ca, C 
3. Fitch Ratings: AAA, AA +, AA, AA-, A +, A, 
A-, BBB +, BBB, BBB-, BB +, BB, BB-, B +, B, B-, 
CCC, DDD, DD, D. 
 Whereas for PEFINDO as a local rating 
agency that provides rating ratings for various 
types of debt securities companies in Indonesia 
have the following rating levels: AAA, AA, A, 
BBB, BB, B, CCC, D. 
 Credit Rating is an assessment that 
illustrates the default risk of companies that 
issue debt. The rating agencies usually provide 
the results of their studies to show the 
relationship of the rating to the possibility of 
default of the company. Blume et al. (1998) and 
Jorion (2009) gave different results about the 
credit rating environment from 1978 to 2002. 
Blume et al. (1998) found that companies' 
decline in the observed corporate debt rating 
was determined by rating agencies that apply 
strict credit standards, whereas Jorion (2009) 
found that after controlling the quality of 
accounting information, there was no 
tightening of credit standards.  
 
Real Profit Management 
 Schipper (1989) states that earnings 
management is an intervention with a specific 
purpose in the external financial reporting 
process to obtain profits for its benefit. 
Whereas real earnings management is 
management actions that deviate from 
standard business practices carried out with 
the primary objective to achieve profit targets 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010). Real earnings management can be done 
in 3 (three) ways, namely: 
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a. Sales Manipulation 
Sales manipulation is an attempt to 
temporarily increase sales in specific periods 
by offering excessive product price discounts 
or providing softer credit terms. This strategy 
can increase sales volume and profit for the 
current period, assuming a decisive margin. 
However, giving rebates and softer credit 
terms will reduce cash flow for the current 
period. 
b. Decreased discretionary expenses 
(discretionary expenditures) 
Companies can reduce discretionary 
expenditures such as research and 
development expenses, advertising, and sales, 
administration, and general, especially in 
periods where these expenses do not directly 
cause revenue and profit. This strategy can 
increase profit and cash flow for the current 
period and decrease future cash flow. 
c. Overproduction 
To increase profits, company managers can 
produce more than needed, assuming that a 
higher production level will cause fixed costs 
per unit of product to be lower. This strategy 
can reduce the cost of goods sold and increase 
operating profit. 
Roychowdhury (2006) provides empirical 
evidence that companies carry out real 
earnings management to avoid reporting 
losses. Zang (2012) shows empirical proof that 
actual earnings management actions are 
carried out before accrual-based earnings 
management.  
 
Corporate Governance 
 Corporate governance is a series of 
structured processes used to manage and 
direct or lead a business or corporate business 
venture to enhance the company's values and 
the business community. According to the 
OECD (The Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) (2003), good 
corporate governance is a structure that by 
stakeholders, shareholders, commissioners, 
and managers sets company goals and means 
to achieve these goals and oversee 
performance. 
 Previous research has examined the 
relationship between corporate governance 
and the amount and quality of information 
disclosure made by companies (Eng and Mak 
2003; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Ajinkya et 
al., 2005; Davidson et al., 2005; Baxter and 
Cotter 2009; Wang and Hussainey 2013). The 
study results found that good corporate 
governance will lead to higher quality 
disclosures in mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures and lead to higher earnings 
forecasting. The more top quality of corporate 
governance is also related to the lack of 
earnings management actions and lower 
incidence of fraud (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et 
al., 1995; Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2000). The 
influence of corporate governance on users of 
financial statements such as business analysts 
(Byard et al., 2006) and agency credit ratings 
have also been tested (Ball et al., 2012; Bradley 
& Chen, 2015; Kent & Stewart, 2008).  
               FCGI (Indonesian Corporate 
Governance Forum) states that the board of 
commissioners is the core of corporate 
governance. Its job is to ensure the 
implementation of the company's strategy, 
oversee management in managing the 
company, and require accountability. The 
board of commissioners' ability to monitor is a 
positive function of the portion and 
independence of the external board of 
commissioners. The board of commissioners is 
also responsible for the quality of the reports 
presented (Siallagan and Machfoedz, 2006). So 
it can be concluded that if the board of 
commissioners performs their duties properly 
and the quality of reports produced is getting 
better, then the risk of the company will be 
smaller. The company's bond rating will also 
have a good impact. An independent 
commissioner is a body within a company that 
usually consists of an independent board of 
commissioners from outside the company 
whose function is to assess the company's 
overall and overall performance (Susiana and 
Herawaty, 2007). The existence of an 
independent commissioner is intended to 
create a more objective and independent 
climate. The presence of objectivity, 
independence, and balance created by the 
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independent commissioners will positively 
impact the company's bond rating 
 
Real Profit Management and Credit Rating 
 Geiszler (2014) examined the 
relationship between accrual quality, real 
activity earnings management, corporate 
governance, and credit ratings in the United 
States using three models to measure accrual 
quality, namely the modified Jones model, the 
cash flow model, and the revenue model. Real 
activity earnings management was tested 
using the Roychowdury model. Another thing 
tested is whether the Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act of 2006 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010 affect the relationship between the quality 
of accounting information with credit ratings. 
The results indicate that accrual quality is a 
significant factor in influencing the grade 
received by the company at the company level. 
Companies with lower accrual quality also 
receive lower credit ratings. Real activity 
earnings management also affects credit 
ratings at the company level.  
 Whereas John (2016) tests whether 
companies that lack earnings management 
strategies to achieve credit ratings are expected 
after the implementation of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOx) and Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank). As expected, the study results indicate 
that fewer accrual-based earnings 
management strategies were used after SOx 
and that there was an increase in real-activity-
based earnings management strategies in the 
period before the occurrence of a major 
corporate scandal. 
 Zang (2012) found that managers use 
real activity earnings management as a 
substitute for accrual earnings management. 
Practical activity earnings management is an 
effort to better direct or present the company's 
financial condition than the actual situation. 
As a result, it is conditioned on the ability of 
the rating agency to detect real earnings 
management; it must be linked to credit 
ratings. This leads to the first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Real earnings management 
influences credit ratings 
Corporate Governance and Credit Rating 
 The results of testing corporate 
governance variables using a proxy for the size 
of the board of commissioners, the 
composition of the board of commissioners, 
the independence of the board of 
commissioners, the freedom of the audit 
committee and the Index based on the 24 
provisions used by the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center by Geiszler (2014) show 
different results. The size of the board of 
commissioners and the independence of the 
board and the composition of the board of 
commissioners affect the credit rating. In 
contrast, the audit committee does not affect 
the credit rating. Corporate governance at the 
company level provides an in-depth look at 
the overall reporting environment (Gompers et 
al. (2003); Brown & Caylor (2006); Grinstein & 
Chhaochharia (2007). The results show that 
corporate governance has an indirect influence 
on information reported by the company. For 
example, companies with poor corporate 
governance may lack internal control over 
financial reporting or may employ managers 
with less binding ethical codes. Weak 
corporate governance can reduce the reliability 
of financial statement information. Financial 
information that is inherently unreliable will 
make decisions or assessments riskier. Firms 
with more significant risk should get a lower 
credit rating than less risky companies, so it 
makes sense that corporate governance at the 
company level is a factor that affects the credit 
rating process. This leads to the second 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: Corporate governance 
influences credit ratings 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Population and Sample 
 The population in this study are all 
non-financial sector companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2015-2017. 
Determination of the sample using a purposive 
sampling method with criteria: companies that 
get credit ratings from PT PEFINDO and have 
complete real earnings management and 
corporate governance data, to obtain 46 
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company samples with a total of 107 
observations.  
 
Variable Measurement 
The independent variables in this study are: 
1. Real Profit Management. 
Real earnings management is management 
actions that deviate from standard business 
practices carried out with the primary goal of 
achieving profit targets (Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Real earnings 
management is calculated using the approach 
used by Roychowdhury (2006), which is as 
follows: 
a. Abnormal CFO 
tttttttt ASASAACFO    )/()/()/1(/ 13121101
 
CFOt = company operating cash flow i in year 
t 
At-1 = total assets of a company i year t-1 
St = total sales of the company I in ¬ ¬-1 
For each year's observation, the abnormal 
operating cash flow (ABN_CFO) is the residual 
value of the estimated regression equation 
model above. 
 
b. Abnormal Discretionary Expenses 
tttttt ASAADISEXP    )/()/1(/ 1121101
 
Disrupt = discretionary expenses, namely 
research and development costs plus 
advertising costs plus sales, administration, 
and general costs.  
Abnormal production costs (ABN_PROD) are 
the residual values from the estimated 
regression equation model above. 
 
c. Abnormal Production Costs 
tttttttttt ASASASAAPROD    )/()/()/()/1(/ 11313121101
 
PRODt = production cost, which is the cost of 
goods sold plus changes in inventory. 
Discretionary costs are the sum of advertising 
costs, research and development costs, sales 
costs, and general and administrative costs. 
Abnormal discretionary expenses 
(ABN_DISEXP) are obtained from the residual 
value of the estimated regression equation 
model above. 
 
2. Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is a series of structured 
processes used to manage and direct or lead a 
business or corporate business venture to 
enhance the company's values and the 
business community. In this study, corporate 
governance is proxied by the size of the board 
of commissioners, independent 
commissioners, and audit committees (Byard 
et al., 2006). 
 
Dependent variables 
Credit Rating 
 Credit Rating is a standardized 
assessment of the ability of a country or 
company to pay its debts. The rating of a 
company can be compared with other 
companies so that it can be distinguished who 
has better and less ability. Rating companies 
issue grades, and usually, to become a rating 
company must obtain official permission from 
the government. According to Karyani and 
Manurung (2008), a rating is one of the 
variables that is considered by investors when 
deciding to invest in a company. The 
information contained in the evaluation will 
indicate the extent of a company's ability to 
pay its obligations on funds invested by 
investors. In this study, the credit rating is 
measured by the scores made by PEFINDO, 
namely AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, D on a 
nominal scale.  
 
Data analysis technique 
 This research uses secondary data. 
Data were analyzed using multiple linear 
regression techniques to determine whether 
the variables of accrual quality, real earnings 
management, and corporate governance affect 
the credit rating. Hypothesis testing uses 
multiple regression analysis with the following 
models: 
Y = α + β1ABNCFO + β2ABNDISCEXP + 
β3ABNPROD + β4DK + β5KI + β6KA + ε 
Where: 
Y = credit rating 
α = intercept 
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ABNCFO = Abnormal Operating Cash Flow 
ABNDISCEXP = Abnormal Discretionary Fees 
ABNPROD = Abnormal Production Costs 
DK = Board of Commissioners 
KI = Independent Commissioner 
KA = Audit Committee 
Before conducting a regression test, the 
classical assumptions are tested, namely 
normality, multicollinearity, autocorrelation, 
and heterocedasticity. 
 
RESULT 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Statistics and Classical Assumption 
Test 
 Descriptive statistics are statistical 
analyzes that provide an overview of the 
distribution of data without generalizing or 
drawing conclusions on the data. The classic 
assumption test is a test conducted to obtain 
sufficient confidence. The linearity assumption 
in the model is not disturbed by bias. The bias 
can start from the disruption of data 
distribution (normality) and the correlation 
between observed variables (autocorrelation). 
Interference between observational periods 
(multicollinearity) and data characteristics 
(heteroscedasticity) could also increase the 
bias. Descriptive statistics of this study are 
presented in Table 4.1 as follows: 
 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
CR 107 1.00 10.00 5.710 2.014 
ABN CFO 107 -0.33 0.24 -0.014 0.099 
ABN PROD 107 -0.93 0.62 -0.038 0.241 
DK 107 2.00 10.00 4.962 1.821 
KI 107 1.00 4.00 1.831 0.679 
KA 107 0.00 6.00 3.233 0.708 
Valid N (listwise) 107     
 
  
This study fulfills the classic assumptions 
required in the use of multiple linear 
regression models after removing the 
Abnormal Discretionary Expenditure variable 
from the research model. Abnormal 
Discretionary Expenditure variables are 
excluded because they contain high 
multicollinearity symptoms with a Variance 
Inflation Factor value more significant than the 
allowed threshold value (VIF£10). Sample 
normality testing is carried out using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov One-Sample test. For 
autocorrelation testing with the Durbin 
Watson coefficient test. And multicollinearity 
testing the Variance Inflation Factor value. 
Besides that, heteroscedasticity testing using 
the Gleijser test. 
 
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
 Multiple linear regression has several 
analytical models that can be used to get the 
best coefficient estimation based on the 
characteristics of the data used in the study. 
The data used in this study is panel data that 
combines cross-section data and time series 
data as observation units. A summary of the 
results of the multiple linear regression of this 
study is presented in table 4.2 as follows: 
 
 
Table 4.2. Summary of Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
Model Koefisien 
Konstanta 2.387  
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Abn CFO 7.743** 
Abn Prod -0.112 
DK   0.473** 
KI -0.078 
KA 0.366 
F  19.376** 
R2 0.490 
Adj R2 0.464 
 
 The results of the multiple linear 
regression analysis in table 4.2 show that the 
independent variable AbnCFO and the Board 
of Commissioners influence the Credit Rating 
variable. In contrast, the AbnPROD variable, 
Independent Commissioner (KI), and Audit 
Committee (KA) do not affect Credit Rating. 
The coefficient of determination (R-Square and 
Adjusted R-Square) is 0.490 and 0.464. This 
value indicates that the independent variable 
used in the model can explain the variation in 
the value of the dependent variable (Credit 
Rating) of 46.4%. F test results in the research 
model have significance below the specified 
threshold (5%). These results indicate the 
suitability of the model (Model Fit) used in this 
study. 
 
Discussion 
The Effect of Real Earnings Management on Credit 
Rating 
 The results of the linear regression 
analysis of this study indicate that the first 
hypothesis stating that real earnings 
management for the Abn CFO proxy affects 
statistically supported Credit Rating. In line 
with researchers' allegations that companies 
tend to shift from accrual earnings 
management to real earnings management, 
practical earnings management is a method 
that can be used by company management to 
show the company's performance to users of 
financial statements. Real earnings 
management is the concern of the credit rating 
agency (Credit Rating Agency), considering 
that the components used in practical earnings 
management directly affect the company's 
cash flow. Certainty about the nature, amount, 
and availability of cash flows in the future of a 
company is a determinant used by rating 
agencies to determine the company's debt 
rating. This result is also consistent with 
Geiszler (2014), John (2016), and Zang (2012), 
who state that real activity earnings 
management also affects credit ratings at the 
company level.  
 While the AbnPROD Real Profit 
Management proxy shows negative coefficient 
results and has no effect on Credit Rating, 
according to Geiszler (2014), this is related to 
overproduction or increased production to 
artificially reduce the cost of goods sold 
(COGS), which affects the lower credit rating. 
Gunny (2010) found that companies that did 
real earnings management to achieve their 
profit targets relatively displayed better 
company performance than companies that 
failed to attain predetermined profit targets. If 
bondholders assess that practical earnings 
management is a popular business activity by 
them, the relationship that will emerge 
between real earnings management and the 
costs of issuing corporate bonds is negative. 
The reason given is following the results of the 
study of Graham et al. (2005). Through real 
earnings management activities, managers are 
more difficult for investors to detect related to 
the earnings management strategy used. With 
the increasingly limited access and ability of 
investors and bond rating agencies, in 
providing an actual assessment of the bond's 
risk, they are judging that the company's 
operating activities are in reasonable 
condition. 
 Furthermore, the reasons for the 
differences in the results of this study with Ge 
and Kim (2014) can also be strengthened by 
the results of the survey of Bhojraj et al. (2009). 
Bhojraj et al.'s research (2009) indicates that the 
stock market has misjudged real earnings 
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management practices in the year of 
manipulation. In the short term, financial 
markets value companies that manage real 
earnings at prices higher than they are.  
 
The Effect of Corporate Governance on Credit 
Rating 
 The results of this study indicate that 
corporate governance affects Credit Rating on 
the Board of Commissioners' Size component. 
While the two parts, such as Independent 
Commissioner and Audit Committee, did not 
modify the company's credit rating. 
Regression results for the first hypothesis in 
this study showed a board size coefficient of 
0.473 and a significant effect at the level of 
0.001, so the first hypothesis was supported. 
Previous literature states that the size of the 
board of commissioners is less effective. Still, 
the results of this study indicate that the size of 
the board of commissioners that it turns out is 
also associated with a higher credit rating. This 
study is consistent with Geiszler's (2014) 
research, which states that the board of 
commissioners' size is positively related to 
credit rating. This indicates that when 
corporate governance increases, the credit 
rating is also higher.  
 This study does not support the 
statement of the first hypothesis that the 
existence of an independent commissioner 
influences credit rating. Independent 
Commissioners have no effect on Credit 
Rating with a significance level of 0.834. This 
happens because of the possibility of the lack 
of dominant independent commissioners from 
the outside so that their existence is not 
enough to play a role as a balancing decision 
in the composition of the membership of the 
board of commissioners and to balance the 
strength of management, consistent with 
Utami's study (2012) which states that the 
minimum requirement of 30% of the total 
members the board of commissioners issued 
by Bapepam may not be high enough to make 
independent commissioners dominate in terms 
of policies taken by the board of 
commissioners. The composition of the 
commissioners' composition is still low so that 
collectively the independent commissioners do 
not have the power to influence all decisions 
made by the board of commissioners. If an 
independent commissioner has a majority of 
votes of more than 50%, an independent 
commissioner may be more effective in 
oversight activities within the company. 
Rasyid and Kostaman (2013) also stated that 
this could be caused by an independent 
commissioner's appointment by a company 
that might only be carried out to fulfill 
regulations but was not intended to uphold 
Good Corporate Governance. Maybe even the 
independent commissioners appointed by the 
company are not competent in accounting or 
finance.  
 The Audit Committee does not affect 
the Credit Rating with a significance level of 
0.092. This can occur because a board of 
commissioners appoints members of the audit 
committee. This member, who is more 
dominant within the company, leads to a 
conflict of interest within the company. 
Sihotang (2011) and Utami (2012) explained 
that the existence of an audit committee by a 
company might only be done to fulfill 
regulations. Still, it was not intended to uphold 
good corporate governance within the 
company. According to Mariana (2016), this 
insignificant result was made possible because 
the audit committee formed by the board of 
commissioners could not play as it should. In 
general, this committee functions as the 
supervisor of the process of making financial 
reports and internal controls. The audit 
committee is expected to act more efficiently, 
but it can also have weaknesses. Namely, the 
lack of member experience in finance or the 
level of independence is still questionable. So 
the audit committee is not able to significantly 
influence bond ratings. The responsibility of 
the Audit Committee in the field of Corporate 
Governance is to ensure that the company has 
been run according to applicable laws and 
regulations, conducts its business ethically, 
carries out its supervision effectively against 
conflicts of interest and fraud committed by 
company employees. The role of the Audit 
Committee is to oversee and provide input to 
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the Board of Commissioners regarding the 
creation of a supervisory mechanism. But in 
reality, many members of the Audit 
Committee do not have sufficient knowledge 
in internal control matters, and not even a few 
who lack accounting background. (FCGI) It is 
stated in the FCGI that the Audit Committee 
must consist of individuals who are 
independent and not involved in the day-to-
day tasks of management who manage the 
company, and who have the experience to 
perform the supervisory function effectively. 
This is so that integrity and views can be 
objective in the report and preparation of 
recommendations submitted by the Audit 
Committee to the Board of Commissioners. 
The number of members of the Audit 
Committee is adjusted to the extent of the 
organization and responsibilities. But usually, 
three to five members is a pretty ideal number. 
The Audit Committee often needs to hold 
meetings three to four times a year to carry out 
its obligations and responsibilities concerning 
the financial reporting system. (The Institute of 
Internal Auditors, Internal Auditing, and The 
Audit Committee in FCGI. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
Conclusion 
 This research was conducted to 
determine the effect of Real Profit 
Management and Corporate Governance on 
Credit Rating. This study's results indicate that 
Real Profit Management, which is proxied by 
ABnCFO, affects the supported Credit Rating. 
While the ABnPROD proxy does not affect 
Credit Rating. In the corporate governance 
variable, only the Board of Commissioners' 
proxy shows a significant influence on Credit 
Rating. Other Corporate Governance Proxies, 
namely Independent Commissioners and 
Audit Committees, have no impact on Credit 
Rating.  
 
Suggestion 
 This research produces the following 
suggestions: 
1. Advice for Companies 
The results of this study can be used by 
company management to consider the content 
of accrual quality and earnings management 
actions that affect cash flow (real earnings 
management) in the company's financial 
statements. Both of these things will prove to 
be a consideration of debt rating agencies in 
determining the rating (Credit Rating) of a 
company. A good rating provides an 
opportunity for management to expand access 
to corporate finance and reduce the company's 
capital costs. 
2. For Further Researchers 
The results of this study can be used as a 
reference in subsequent studies. Future studies 
can add a more extended observation period 
to prove the theory's consistency, especially 
those related to the use of corporate 
governance components. Subsequent 
researchers can develop using the continued 
contribution of the corporate governance 
mechanism disclosed in the company's annual 
report as additional information that can be 
considered by a rating agency (Credit Rating 
Agency) in rating a company's debt. 
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